

Democracy, Indonesian Military, and 2019 Elections

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Is there a growing militarization of Indonesian democracy? This article argues that at this point, the military as an organization does not willingly and independently interfere in civilian affairs. Rather, the military's involvement should be put in its context, notably the weaknesses of successive civilian governments, especially Joko Widodo administration, that forces it to ask for the military for support; personal ambition of General Gatot Nurmantyo, the Chief of the Military, who was using the military as a tool for promoting himself for the Presidential Election of 2019; and the institutional weaknesses of the military itself, that created the condition for the involvement of the military in political affairs.

Introduction

In the recent years, there have been concerns about the growing influence of Indonesian military in politics, leading one scholar to warn about the “growing militarization of Indonesian democracy.”¹ Such opinion was not at all without foundation. Under the former Chief of Staff General Gatot Nurmantyo, the Indonesian military increased its involvement with the civilian bureaucracy in various social and economic programs, even without written orders from President Joko Widodo.² In January 2019, Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto, Gatot’s successor, announced that the military would revise the Regulation 34 Year 2004, which limits the role of military in civilian affairs, in order to allow military personnel to serve in civilian ministries.³ Tom Power, a scholar who specializes in Indonesian political parties, argues that President Joko Widodo has been taking an «authoritarian turn» by mobilizing the military to promote his government’s achievements in order to support his reelection during the 2019 Presidential Election, which has the obvious effect of expanding the role of the military further in politics.⁴

Such concerns, however, are overly alarmist. While the role of the military in civilian affairs has indeed been expanding over the past couple of years, it was caused less by the military’s direct willingness to get involved in politics, than several external and internal factors working together. Notably, the weaknesses of the civilian government, due to red tape and the way to allocate ministerial seats, General Gatot Nurmantyo’s political ambitions, widely believed to harbor the ambition to become the next president of Indonesia, and internally, military’s organizational problems due to its doctrine that focuses on *resilience*, can be cited as factors for increased military involvement in civilian affairs. These factors were further exacerbated by the heightened political atmosphere due to 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, which showed that President Joko Widodo, in spite of his accomplishment, could be defeated in the Presidential Election of 2019.

In other words, while the military as an institution does not purposely involve itself in civilian affairs, it does get involved inadvertently due to the political choices of various actors and its own internal weaknesses.

1 - Tom Pepinsky, “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Problem of Surplus Officers,” Personal Blog, February 22, 2019. (<https://tompepinsky.com/2019/02/22/civil-military-relations-in-indonesia-and-the-problem-of-surplus-officers/>)

2 - Mawa Kresna, “Jendral Gatot dan Reformasi TNI [General Gatot and TNI Reformation],” *Tirto.id*, 8 December 2017 (<https://tirto.id/jendral-gatot-dan-reformasi-tni-cBfA>)

3 - Erik Purnama Putra, “Panglima: Perwira TNI akan ditempatkan di Kementerian [Chief of the Military: Military Officers will be placed in ministries],” *Republika*, 31 January 2019 (<https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/19/01/31/pm6ovb430-panglima-perwira-tni-akan-ditempatkan-di-kementerian>)

4 - Tom Power, “Jokowi’s authoritarian turn,” *New Mandala*, 9 October 2018 (<https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-authoritarian-turn/>)

The Weaknesses of Civilian Government

One of the characteristics of post-reformation Indonesian cabinet is its lack of unity. Indonesian bureaucracy is notorious for its inability to cooperate, as many of the ministers are appointed due to their affiliation as part of the ruling coalition, and not based on their competence. As a result, they treat their ministries as their own fief, channeling the state money for the benefit of their political parties and supporters.⁵

Any presidential attempt to reform the cabinet and centralize the power would be politically suicidal. President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first post-reformation elected president, put himself on the path of collision with political parties and the parliament as he tried to get rid of some of his ministers, whom he believed to be more loyal to their parties than to him.⁶ His action ended up sparking a successful impeachment drive by his political opponents in the parliament, under a flimsy, unproven accusation of corruption.⁷

Not surprisingly, Wahid’s successors learned to live with unwieldy cabinets that may not have the presidents’ best interests at heart and to keep those party apparatchiks in the cabinet in order to prevent political parties from causing problems or to launch an impeachment. Even President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was reelected by a landslide majority of 60.80% in 2009 and whose Democratic Party held the largest number of seats in the parliament, with 20.85% of the total seats, did not dare to change the system, even though he grumbled in 2011 that more than 50% of his instructions to his ministers were not followed at all.⁸ A few months later, he further complained that his ministers were not responsive to problems in the society.⁹

President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was elected in 2014 by 53.15% of the votes. His governing coalition in the beginning only held 37.14% of the total seats in the parliament, making it a minority government. His attempt to craft a small cabinet with loyal and competent ministers was thwarted by his own vice-president Jusuf Kalla, who forced Jokowi to give fifteen cabinet posts for political parties. Similar to previous presidents, he also faced entrenched vested interests, ineffective local government, rampant corruption, and

5 - Marcus Mietzner, “Soldiers, Parties and Bureaucrats: Illicit Fund-Raising in Contemporary Indonesia,” *Southeast Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2008) 241-2

6 - Jose Manuel Tesoro, “Nation Adrift,” *Asiaweek.com*, July 7, 2000, Vol. 29, No. 26. (<http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0707/nat.indo.main.html>)

7 - Fana Suparman, “Meluruskan Fakta Sejarah Lengsernya Gus Dur [Straightening historical facts on the resignation of Gus Dur],” *Berita Satu*, January 12, 2016 (<https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/340330/meluruskan-fakta-sejarah-lengsernya-gus-dur>)

8 - “Ada Kelemahan Kepemimpinan [There’s a weakness in leadership],” *Kompas*, July 13, 2011 (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/07/13/03525586/Ada.Kelemahan.Kepemimpinan>)

9 - “SBY Mengeluh Kabinetnya Belum Responsif [SBY complained that his cabinet wasn’t responsive enough],” *Suara Pembaruan*, December 2, 2011 (<https://sp.beritasatu.com/home/sby-mengeluh-kabinetnya-belum-responsif/14354>)

competing bureaucracies that made it very difficult for him to coordinate the various ministries in order to push for national initiatives.¹⁰

Such weaknesses of the Indonesian civilian government make it very difficult for any president to get things done. However, Jokowi's legitimacy stems from his reputation as a doer, a builder. Therefore, Jokowi started to rely more on the military, both for political support and as way to get his priorities done – notably infrastructure building in eastern part of Indonesia.¹¹ He appointed Army General Gatot Nurmantyo as the head of the military in order to strengthen his support in the military¹², which inadvertently dragged the military to roles that supposedly belong to civilians.

In essence, it is much more feasible for Jokowi to rely on the military organizations to get things done quickly in a short term than to spend a lot of time and political capital to reform the government and civil service. In fact, Jokowi's efforts to reduce the number of civil servants,¹³ streamline regulations¹⁴, and increase the accountability of civil servants such as by imposing e-budgeting in order to make it difficult to commit corrupt practices,¹⁵ made him widely unpopular among civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises. During the 2019 Presidential Election, 72% of the civil servants and 78% of employees of state-owned enterprises voted for Prabowo Subianto, his rival in the presidential election.¹⁶

In summary, the fractious nature of Indonesian government, where political parties view the ministries as a place to dispense patronage, combined with unwieldy bureaucracy force the president to bypass the civilian government and rely on the military to get things done.

10 - Leonard C. Sebastian, Emirza Adi Syailendra, and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia after the Reform Period," *Asia Policy*, Volume 13, No. 3, July 2018. pp. 55-56.

11 - "Update on the Indonesian Military's Influence," *IPAC Report*, No. 26, 11 March 2016. pp. 2 (http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/03/IPAC_Report_No_26_.pdf)

12 - Emirza Adi Syailendra, "Under Suharto's Shadow: Jokowi and the Indonesian Military," *Foreign Affairs*, August 12, 2015 (<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/indonesia/2015-08-12/under-suhartos-shadow>)

13 - Ayomi Aminoni, "Indonesia seen to have 1 million excess civil servants," *The Jakarta Post*, June 7, 2016. (<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/06/07/indonesia-seen-to-have-1-million-excess-civil-servants.html>)

14 - Anton Hermansyah, "More rules, more corruption: Jokowi," *The Jakarta Post*, December 11, 2017. (<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/12/11/more-rules-more-corruption-jokowi.html>)

15 - Christoforus Ristiano, "Survei Charta Politica: Jokowi-Ma'rif Lemah di Tingkat Pemilih PNS dan Pegawai Desa [Charta Politica Survey: support for Jokowi-Ma'rif is weak among civil servants and village apparatus]," *Kompas.com*, January 16, 2019. (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/01/16/20023971/survei-charta-politika-jokowi-maruf-lemah-di-tingkat-pemilih-pns-dan-pegawai>)

16 - Chandra Gian Asmara, "72% Anggota PNS Ternyata Pilih Prabowo-Sandiaga, Percaya? [Do you believe that 72% of civil servants voted for Prabowo-Sandiaga?]," *CNBCIndonesia*, 28 May, 2019. (<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190528193848-4-75626/72-anggota-pns-ternyata-pilih-prabowo-sandiaga-percaya>)

General Gatot Nurmantyo's Ambition

A second factor that creates the perception that the military is getting more and more involved in politics is the behavior of General Gatot Nurmantyo, former Chief of Staff, who was widely believed to harbor presidential ambition. Under his leadership, the military has been getting more and more involved in non-military tasking, arguing that it is for the sake of national interest. As mentioned in the previous section, it is true that the civilian government under President Jokowi was asking the military for their assistance to get things done. General Nurmantyo, however, pushed it further by increasing the military's involvement in civilian bureaucracy, in various social and economic programs, even without written orders from President Joko Widodo.¹⁷

The military was a good springboard for his presidential ambition: in spite of its past records, the military remains the most popular institution in Indonesia. One survey noted that 94% of the respondents thought that the military had good reputation, closely followed by the anti-corruption commission at 88.5%. On the other hand, only 42.2% of the respondents thought that the Indonesian Parliament had good reputation.¹⁸ A Pew Research Center's Global Attitude Survey in Spring 2017, also stated that 68% of Indonesians thought that military rules would be good for the country¹⁹, while 69% of Indonesians were satisfied with the way democracy worked in Indonesia.

General Nurmantyo was also involved in practical politics, appearing with the *212 Movement*, a union of Islamic hardline groups whose used religion as a cudgel to defeat Basuki "Ahok" Tjahja Purnama, a Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta and an ally of Jokowi, in the Jakarta gubernatorial Election of 2017. Despite the fact that Ahok had an enviable 70% approval rating²⁰, he was handily defeated by his political opponents, who used hoaxes, disinformation, anti-Chinese propaganda, and religious fear-mongering to scare voters. Emboldened by its success in defeating Ahok, the *212 Movement* managed to gain a lot of clout, which, in turn, was used

17 - Kresna (2017)

18 - Ambaranie Nadia Kemala Movatina, "Survei Kompas: Citra TNI Naik hingga 94 persen, Citra DPR Terendah [Kompas Survey: TNI's reputation improved to 94 percent, the reputation of the House the lowest]," *Kompas*, October 21, 2017. (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/21/07122651/survei-kompas-citra-tni-naik-hingga-94-persen-citra-dpr-terendah>)

19 - Richard Wike, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Janell Fetterolf, "Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy," *Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends*, October 16, 2017. (<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-direct-democracy/>)

20 - Kate Lamb, "Jakarta election challenger Anies accused of courting Islamic vote amid religious divide," *The Guardian*, 15 April 2017. (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/15/jakarta-election-challenger-anies-accused-of-courting-islamic-vote-amid-religious-divide>)

to try to bring down Jokowi himself.²¹ By appearing with the *212 Movement*, General Nurmantyo seemed to indicate that the military supported and assisted the *212 Movement*.²² He also benefited of the movement's goodwill towards him, with some members assisting him when he was considering running for president in 2019.²³

Moreover, in order to strengthen his nationalist and religious clout, General Nurmantyo kept stressing the hidden danger of the resurgence of the already banned and destroyed Indonesian Communist Party. In September 2017, a few months after the Jakarta gubernatorial election, General Nurmantyo declared that he was raising the awareness of the threat posed by the Communists by instructing the military to screen a Suharto-era propaganda film that depicted the 1965 Communist Revolt in Indonesia. By pushing the issue of communism to the forefront, General Nurmantyo was seen as challenging and damaging President Jokowi, who was dogged by the false accusations that he was both a descendant of a Communist and a closet communist himself.²⁴

Seeing that General Nurmantyo would be a political threat as long as he would remain Chief of Staff, President Jokowi decided to replace him by Air Force Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto. To make sure that General Nurmantyo would no longer be able to utilize his support in the military, Jokowi also cancelled one of General Nurmantyo's last orders, which posted his supporters to important military leadership positions.²⁵

In summary, the Indonesian military was seen as getting more and more politicized, in order to fulfill General Nurmantyo's individual political ambitions, even though Nurmantyo himself kept professing that the TNI would remain neutral when dealing with practical politics.²⁶

However, that was only true as long as General Nurmantyo was in command. He was obeyed due to the chain of command that basically forces military officers to obey their superiors, and due to the fact that, as the chief of the military, he controlled personnel promotion. Once General Nurmantyo was ousted, his successor prevented General Nurmantyo's loyalists to

further control strategic positions²⁷ and reduced the remainder of his influence in the military organization. In a sense, the military's assertiveness in political affairs is influenced by its commander.

Military's Internal Weaknesses

One of the main components of Indonesia's military doctrine is the principle of national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*) as the source of national strength. The principle of national resilience originates in the Japanese occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War, when the Japanese trained an indigenous Indonesian Army called PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air* or Defenders of the Homeland), in order to defend their Indonesian possession from the Allied invasion.²⁸ The focus of the training was mostly in nationalism and fighting spirit, with the belief of "strength of the spirit over the strength of the material"²⁹ and thus soldiers should "sincerely commit and have the courage to struggle."³⁰ Later, the idea of "strength of the spirit" was further expanded, in response to what the Indonesian military saw as a political and economic chaos and against foreign interferences that would threaten the national identity and the unity of Indonesia. The army saw that throughout its history, the country was racked by rebellions and unrests, such as the Soviet-Backed Communist Rebellion of 1948, the Islamist rebellion of Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement, United States-sponsored regional rebellion of PRRI/Permesta (Revolutionary Government of Republic Indonesia/ Universal People Struggle), and communist-backed land seizure movements that led to communal clashes throughout Indonesia. This trend culminated in 1965, with what the military believed to be a Communist China-sponsored communist coup that led to the demise of six of the top leaders of the army.

What these incidents teach the army is that the biggest threat for Indonesia comes not from the traditional threat of direct outside invasion; rather it is from foreign-supported harmful culture and ideas that would create havoc within the country. Due to its experience with these rebellions, the military focuses on an indirect attack on the country through a communist "fifth column," and in recent years, through "proxy war," "systematic asymmetric warfare," cyberwarfare, and media propaganda intended to create conflicts based

27 - Tim Merdeka, "Beda Panglima Kostrad pilihan Jendral Gatot dan Marsekal Hadi [General Gatot and Marshall Hadi picked different Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command]," *Merdeka.com*, January 6, 2018 (<https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/beda-panglima-kostrad-pilihan-jenderal-gatot-dan-marsekal-hadi.html>)

28 - Shigeru Sato, "Gatot Mangkupraja, PETA, and the origins of the Indonesian National Army," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 166, No. 2/3 (2010) 198.

29 - Albrecht Fürst von Urach, *Das Geheimnis Japanischer Kraft* [The Secret of Japan's Strength], trans. Randall Bythwerk (Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1943), (<http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archiv/japan.htm>)

30 - Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) 239.

21 - "Anti Ahok to Anti Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia's 2019 Election Campaign," *IPAC*, 15 March 2019. (http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2019/03/Report_55.pdf)

22 - Kresna (2017)

23 - Caesar Akbar, "Sebagian Alumni 212 di Balik Relawan Gatot Nurmantyo [Part of 212 Alums are behind volunteers for Gatot Nurmantyo]" *Tempo.co*, 4 April 2018 (<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1076080/sebagian-alumni-212di-balik-relawan-gatot-nurmantyo/full&view=ok>)

24 - Tom Allard and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, "'Red Scare' puts pressure on Indonesian president," *Reuters*, September 28, 2017. (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-military/red-scare-puts-pressure-on-indonesian-president-idUSKCN1C21AQ>)

25 - Bradley Wood, "Jokowi's military reshuffle is all about 2019," *New Mandala*, 15 December 2017. (<https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-military-reshuffle-2019/>)

26 - Marguerite Afra Sapiie, "TNI's neutrality in spotlight," *The Jakarta Post*, October 6, 2017 (<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/06/tni-s-neutrality-spotlight.html>)

on “social, culture, primordialism, ethnicity, race, and religion.” That attitude still strongly influences Indonesia’s current defense policy. The most recent Defense White Paper (2015), for instance, stresses the need for the government to be aware of any attempt by foreign countries to split Indonesia, citing the “Arab Spring, political and security upheaval in Egypt, [and] civil wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria” as examples of how states wage proxy wars as a 21st century version of “divide and conquer.”³¹

Thus, the military believes that they cannot deal with security only by military strength, rather, any defense policy should cover all aspects of life, namely: ideology, politics, economy, social, cultural, and national defense and security. In other words, the best defense policy is to strengthen national resilience. As noted by then President Suharto back in 1970:

The national resilience concept is the only answer to the challenges posed by a world still dominated by tension. National resilience encompasses ideological resilience, based on a nation’s own identity, which receives the full support of entire nation, economic resilience capable of meeting the nation’s own basic needs, social resilience, which ensures a feeling of solidarity and harmony among the peoples, and an appropriate military resilience to face aggression from outside. Without national resilience, we shall always be afraid.³²

In other words, for Indonesians, the idea of security is not simply a matter of military security in the traditional sense of fighting foreign threats. Rather, it is about maintaining the strength of national resilience that has an inward-looking orientation, securing national identity in the midst of changing conditions, improving relations with other nations, and a non-aggressive and nonbelligerent attitude. In fact, by focusing too much on military threats, countries end up placing “too much reliance on the protective military strength of the great powers,”³³ which, in consequence, impairs their own independence.³⁴ This leads Indonesia to put much stronger emphasis on the army, instead of other branches of the armed forces, notably the Navy and the Air Force, since the biggest threat is supposed to come from within the country and not from outside.

In addition, during the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, the military also saw that too many civilian interventions caused discords and disunity within the military. As a result, under the New Order, the military prevented that from happening again by heavily dominating civil service, with active or retired military officers occupying a majority of positions in Indonesia’s

31 - Ministry of Defense (Indonesia), *Buku putih pertahanan Indonesia 2015* [Indonesian Defense White Book 2015] (Jakarta, 2015) 11.

32 - Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “National versus Regional Resilience: An Indonesian Perspective,” in Derek Da Cunha, *Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security* (Singapore, ISEAS, 2000) 83.

33 - Justus M. van der Kroef, “Indonesia Strategic Perception and Foreign Policy,” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Jan-Feb 1975) 164, 170.

34 - Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). pp. 186-87, 189

central bureaucracy.³⁵ In fact, in 1980, the military held almost half of the cabinet positions, 75 percent of secretary generals, 80 percent of director generals, 84 percent of minister secretaries, and 75 percent of provincial governors.³⁶

At the same time, this situation provided for the outlet for excess high-ranking officers, who could be transferred outside the military organization. Under Regulation 34/2004, which came into effect after the reformation, the military is no longer allowed to occupy civilian positions in the bureaucracy, leading to promotional logjams: because officers cannot be promoted to the right position at the right time, high ranking officers end up having no job within the military structure.³⁷ That, coupled with poorly thought policies, notably the extension of the retirement age from 55 to 58, messy personnel management system due to the lack of transparency in promotion, political interventions from civilian government, and “horizontal rotation” under former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the promotional logjams are getting even worse. In March 2019, 150 general rank officers and 500 colonels were left without jobs.³⁸

This situation forces the military to find quick fixes to solve this problem, lest it would cause demoralization and unrest within the military. This makes for the rationale for Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto to ask for positions for active military officers in civilian ministries and state institutions. President Jokowi approved this demand by signing Presidential Decree Number 37/2019 that allows certain officers to serve in civilian bureaucracy in limited roles,³⁹ as a way to alleviate the logjam. This decision was faced with opposition from the civilian bureaucracy and from activists and civil society representatives.⁴⁰

While this will not solve the military’s problems in the long run, it is hoped that this could serve as Band-Aid solution in the short term. At least, it is hoped that it could alleviate some of the dissents from the military, especially among loyalists of General Nurmantyo, who are still prevalent within the military. A discontent military could create some problems, such as emboldening

35 - John A. McDougall, “Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy,” *Indonesia*, No. 33 (April 1992). pp. 96

36 - Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2002) pp. 36n1

37 - Evan A. Laksmana, “Military personnel problems need more than quick fixes,” *The Jakarta Post*, February 1, 2019. (<https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/02/01/military-personnel-problems-need-more-than-quick-fixes.html>)

38 - Evan A. Laksmana, “Insight: Is Indonesia heading toward a ‘militarized democracy’?” *The Jakarta Post*, March 21, 2019. (<https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/03/21/insight-is-indonesia-heading-toward-a-militarized-democracy.html>)

39 - Ihsanuddin, “Presiden Jokowi Teken Perpres Jabatan Fungsional TNI, Ini Isinya [President Jokowi Signed Presidential Decree on Military’s functional position, this is what in it], *Kompas*, June 29, 2019 (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/06/29/06100051/presiden-jokowi-teken-perpres-jabatan-fungsional-tni-ini-isinya>)

40 - Niniek Karmini, “Indonesia’s jobs for generals plan alarms rights groups,” *Associated Press*, February 8, 2019. (<https://www.apnews.com/fcb641158db8485ea9359ccd40330167>)

people to riot.⁴¹ While the military officers themselves cannot vote, their spouses and children can⁴² and the military's opposition to Jokowi was reflected in the 2019 elections results that saw Jokowi defeated in many of the areas surrounding military bases.⁴³



Conclusion

The current controversy regarding the supposedly growing military's interference in political affairs is not caused by the growing ambition of the military as an institution. In fact, the military as an institution respects the agreement made after the fall of Suharto, notably for the active-duty military personnel to avoid getting involved in practical politics.

Still, over the past years, especially under President Joko Widodo, the military has been getting more and more involved in civilian affairs. However, this is not due to the military's own initiatives. Rather, it is due to the weaknesses of the civilian bureaucracy, combined with political calculation of political actors (namely, in this case, President Jokowi himself and former Chief of Staff General Nurmantyo).

The big question now is what will happen during Jokowi's second term. Unlike in the first term, this time Jokowi handily won with 55.5 percent of the votes and his coalition won 60 percent of the seats in the parliament, with possible increase in numbers, should members of the opposing coalition decide to defect.⁴⁴ Thus, compared to his first term, Jokowi's position is far more secure.

At the same time, the problem lies in Jokowi's agenda ambitions for his second term. There are talks that in this second term, Jokowi is planning to deal with the problems of Moslem radicalism and hardline Islamism by vetting senior public servants in the bureaucracy

and state-owned enterprises.⁴⁵ Obviously, it will be bruising politically, as his opponents will likely throw the accusations that Jokowi is hostile toward Moslems. Jokowi will also likely involve the military, which is well known as the defender of nationalism, which means that the military again will be involved with political issues.

This does not mean, however, that there will be any creeping militarization in the future. The military seems now far more interested in staying in the barracks than dirtying themselves by getting involved in politics. The military should furthermore remember that its good reputation stems from the fact that it is not politicized and seen as a calm oasis in the middle of growing partisanship in Indonesian politics. By getting involved in politics, the military will squander that reputation. Fortunately, so far the military has learned the lesson of the collapse of the New Order.

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41 - Ade S. "Hendropriyono: Kudeta Sipil Tidak Pernah Ada Sejarahnya Berhasil Kecuali Didukung Militer [Civilian coup never succeeded historically unless supported by military]," *Tribunnews.com*, Mei 16, 2019. (<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/05/16/hendropriyono-kudeta-sipil-tidak-pernah-ada-sejarahnya-berhasil-kecuali-didukung-militer>)

42 - Robertus Wardi, "No One Tells the Colonels: Jobless Officers Create Headache for Jokowi," *The Jakarta Globe*, February 26, 2019. (<https://jakartaglobe.id/context/no-one-tells-the-colonels-jobless-officers-create-headache-for-jokowi>)

43 - Reza Gunandha, "Jokowi-Ma'aruf Amin Kalah di 7 TPS Kompleks Paspampres [Jokowi-Ma'aruf Amin lost in seven voting places in Presidential Guard Complexes]" *Suara.com*, April 24, 2019. (<https://www.suara.com/news/2019/04/24/214229/jokowi-maruf-amin-kalah-di-7-tps-kompleks-paspampres>) Interviews with several high ranking military officers: while the military officers stressed the neutrality of the military and they did not pick sides in the election, they acknowledged that Jokowi was losing in area around military bases.

44 - Rakhmat Nur Hakim, "Politisi Demokrat: Kalau Pak Jokowi Meminta, Kami Siap Dukung [Democratic Party Politician: if Mr. Jokowi asks, we are ready to support]," *Kompas.com*, June 25, 2019 (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/06/25/10310131/politisi-demokrat-kalau-pak-jokowi-meminta-kami-siap-dukung>)

45 - Kanupriya Kapoor, "Exclusive: After bruising election, Indonesia to vet public servants to identify Islamists," *Reuters*, June 21, 2019 (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-islamism-exclusive/exclusive-after-bruising-election-indonesia-to-vet-public-servants-to-identify-islamists-idUSKCN1TM0T8>)