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Okada Katsuo, discusses the negotiations between the US and Japan over Futenma [Futenma nichibei kôshô no saizensen wo kataru Okada Katsuo], interview by Tahara Sôichirô, *Chûô Kôron*, July 2010, pp. 91-97. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

Kitaoka Shin'ichi, «What are the prospects for the Minshutô under Kan?» [Kan minshutô no kanôsei wa doko ni aru no ka], *Chûô Kôron*, September 2010, pp.102-109. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

Mikuriya Takashi, «Lacking direction, the political scene could end up without leaders with future prospects» [Kaizu naki nihon seiji, soshite daremo inakunaru], *Chûô Kôron*, September 2010, pp.110-117. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

CLOSE UP ON THE NEWS

1. Inheriting Hatoyama's Boomerang: How the Futenma Relocation Plan Went Back to Henoko and Tests Kan's Leadership - Yuko Kawato, PhD, University of Washington.

While campaigning for his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for the Lower House election in August 2009, Hatoyama Yukio criticized the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for failing to make progress towards closing the Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Originally slated for closure by 2003, the base remained open due to the unfulfilled requirement to establish a replacement facility in Henoko in northern Okinawa. Seeking the votes of Okinawans who opposed any relocation within the prefecture, and to establish in the long term an alliance without U.S. peacetime deployment in Japan (*"jyōji chūryū naki anzen hoshō"*), Hatoyama promised to move Futenma "out of Japan if possible, but out of Okinawa at the very least."

After the electoral victory Hatoyama's government considered alternative sites, but the relocation plan ultimately went back to Henoko like a boomerang. Below I argue that Hatoyama could not fulfill his promise because he failed three tests of leadership. The United States also resisted changing the relocation site. Kan Naoto inherited the Futenma issue, but opposition to relocation within Okinawa increased during Hatoyama's premiership and the Henoko plan has become more difficult to implement.

Test of Leadership 1: Negotiating Base Policy within a Strategic Dialogue

Base policy in Japan often changes when Japan and the United States try to create a shared strategic vision and improve their security alliance's effectiveness. The allies change base policy to fulfill new strategic goals and to obtain public support for an evolving alliance. Although successful base policy negotiations happen within a strategic dialogue, Hatoyama picked up the Futenma

relocation issue before starting this dialogue with the United States. It was extremely important for him to communicate to the United States and the Japanese public what he perceived as regional and global challenges to Japanese interests, what roles the alliance should play to address those challenges, and how the alliance should be improved to that end. The DPJ's election manifesto included a promise to build an "equal" alliance with the United States by establishing an "independent" foreign policy strategy. The United States and the Japanese public wanted to know what such an alliance and foreign policy strategy would look like. Hatoyama's op-ed article just before the election also raised some concerns in the United States that he might distance Japan from the United States to establish a closer relationship with China¹. Hatoyama needed to reassure the United States that he considered the alliance important to Japanese security, before putting any security-related issue on the bilateral negotiating table.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, but Hatoyama could not take advantage of this golden opportunity to negotiate a reduction of Okinawan burden within a comprehensive negotiation to improve the alliance. In fact, because Hatoyama took up the Futenma issue too early and made it a major problem in the alliance, the two governments agreed to "resolve" the Futenma issue *before* starting a discussion on improving the alliance. Hatoyama missed the important opportunity to obtain specific measures to resolve some of the base problems in Okinawa, as concessions from the United States in exchange for Japan's acceptance of increased responsibilities in the alliance.

A related mistake was that Hatoyama focused solely on the Futenma relocation and did not consider other ways to respond to Okinawan grievances until the very end of the negotiations. As a result, the agreement that reaffirmed Henoko as the relocation site lacked specific improvements on various base problems, and merely stated the allies' willingness to discuss some measures in the future. In sum, Hatoyama failed to make progress on Okinawan burden reduction—let alone moving Futenma out of Okinawa—by raising the difficult relocation issue in isolation instead of negotiating a diverse set of base policy issues within a broader strategic discourse.

Test of Leadership 2: Winning Local Communities' Support

Hatoyama failed to find communities that would accept Futenma's facilities, troops, equipment and functions in whole or in part, mainly for two reasons. First, Hatoyama did not impose adequate information control on his government officials, and the media reported the various relocation sites under consideration. Communities mentioned as potential relocation sites organized preemptive protests, limiting Hatoyama's options and curtailing his ability to conduct "nemawashi" or prior coordination with community leaders to obtain their support for the government plan.

More importantly, Hatoyama and other government officials failed to explain why the functions and equipment they wanted to relocate from Futenma had to stay in Japan *and* in the specific communities that they considered for relocation. Local leaders asked why it was necessary for their communities to shoulder the burden for Japanese security. Hatoyama said that he wanted to relocate Futenma's functions outside of Okinawa to spread the alliance's burden more equally, but this was grossly inadequate for the local communities. Furthermore, the communities

¹ Yukio Hatoyama, "A New Path for Japan," *The New York Times*, August 26, 2009.

knew by looking at Okinawa and other base hosts in the mainland that various problems persisted despite the host communities' repeated plea for improvement. The LDP government is responsible for this, but Hatoyama's failure to consider and improve upon various base problems before taking up the relocation issue made it more difficult for him to win local communities' support.

Test of Leadership 3: Working with Bureaucrats

Hatoyama failed to obtain support for moving Futenma out of Okinawa from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The ministries had conducted negotiations with the United States from 1995 to 2006 to reach the agreement to relocate Futenma to Henoko. They had since worked towards implementing the agreement. Therefore, there was significant resistance to Hatoyama's initiative to find alternative relocation sites².

In addition, Hatoyama took up the relocation issue just after the 2009 election, in which the DPJ politicians promised to take back the leadership in policy-making from bureaucrats. For politicians to take a lead in policy-making regarding military bases, especially when they seek to overturn what bureaucrats had achieved, they must have a clear strategic vision for the alliance, knowledge of the bilateral negotiation's history, and command of highly technical base problems. Hatoyama and his colleagues lacked these prerequisites to proceed without bureaucrats' cooperation. After quitting his post, Hatoyama admitted that he should have relied more on bureaucrats' expertise³. Surely, moving Futenma out of

Okinawa would have been difficult even with the bureaucrats' cooperation due to resistance from the United States. But Hatoyama's failure to win over and lead the bureaucrats hampered his efforts.

Why the United States Did Not Budge

The United States insisted that Futenma should relocate to Henoko. Relocation to another site would require obtaining local acquiescence, redrawing construction plans, and restarting the environmental impact assessment. American officials warned that repeating these processes somewhere else would significantly delay Futenma's closure and the relocation of 8,000 Marines to Guam. While Hatoyama explored alternative relocation sites, American officials declared that they would not consider any proposal that was rejected in the past or new proposals that did not enjoy local support. This made it difficult for Hatoyama to propose new sites, because many of the sites that his coalition government officials proposed had been rejected in the LDP government's negotiations with the United States and Okinawa. Preemptive protests in local communities also showed that Hatoyama did not have sites that accepted relocation.

In the past, the United States changed base policy in response to Okinawan protests to reduce significant political and military vulnerability that the protests produced. However, the latest protests in Okinawa and other prefectures did not create such vulnerability for the United States. The latest protests were mostly NIMBY protests, and the United States could maintain its basic stance that protests regarding where to locate U.S. military bases are a domestic problem for the Japanese government to deal with, because Japan is responsible under the security

2 "Motto shidōryoku areba: Hatoyama zen shushō, futenma mondai de hansei no ben [If I had more leadership: Ex-prime minister Hatoyama reflects on the Futenma issue]," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 12, 2010.

3 "Nichibeī dōmei, Fukushima-shi himen nado: Hatoyama shushō kishakaiken no yōshi [On Japan-

U.S. Joint Statement, dismissal of Fukushima: Summary of Prime Minister Hatoyama's press conference]," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 28, 2010.

treaty to provide bases to the United States. The United States lacked political or military incentive to reconsider the Henoko plan.

Inheriting the Futenma Issue: Challenges for Kan

Kan reportedly said in 2005 that Futenma should relocate outside of Okinawa or outside of Japan, but remained publicly silent on the issue during Hatoyama's premiership. Once succeeding Hatoyama, he accepted the Japan-U.S. agreement to relocate Futenma to Henoko. However, Okinawan opposition to the Henoko plan strengthened during Hatoyama's premiership, making relocation to Henoko more difficult to achieve.

Futenma's relocation to Henoko was not a popular plan to begin with. In 1997 a survey by the Okinawa Times showed that 55% of the respondents in Okinawa opposed relocation to Henoko, while 22% supported it. Hatoyama's actions strengthened Okinawan opposition to the Henoko plan. A joint survey by Ryūkyū Shimpō and Mainichi Shimbun on May 28-30, 2010 showed that 84% of the respondents in Okinawa opposed relocation to Henoko. The percentage went up by 17% since the papers' survey in October-November 2009⁴. Approximately 90,000 people participated in the Prefectural Citizens' Rally on April 25, 2010 to demand relocation outside of Okinawa. The opposition to the Henoko plan sees no sign of abating. Recent disclosures that the flight path of U.S. aircraft in Henoko would be closer to civilian areas than the Japanese government had explained, and that the U.S. military plans to introduce Osprey helicopters to Okinawa despite strong local concerns for safety, have renewed the opposition of many

4 "Henoko hantai 84%: Ryūkyū Shimpō-Mainichi Shimbun kenmin yoron chōsa [Opposition to Henoko 84%: Ryūkyū Shimpō-Mainichi Shimbun Opinion Survey in Okinawa]," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, May 31, 2010.

and eroded support among those who had previously accepted the plan.

During Hatoyama's tenure, opposition to relocation within the prefecture spread to all levels of government in Okinawa. The LDP's branch in Okinawa and conservative business organizations used to support the Henoko plan, but the strong public opinion pushed them to change their position. As a result, on February 24, 2010 the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly passed a unanimous resolution to oppose Futenma's relocation within the prefecture. The resolution called for relocation to other prefectures in Japan or abroad. All political parties in Okinawa participated in the Prefectural Citizens' Rally in April. After Hatoyama's acceptance of the Henoko agreement in May, the prefectural assembly passed another resolution against it. The Mayors' Association in Okinawa also passed a unanimous resolution for a prompt return of Futenma without relocation within the prefecture. All 41 mayors, town and village chiefs in Okinawa told the Okinawa Times that they opposed relocation within the prefecture⁵.

Also important was Inamine Susumu's election as the mayor of Nago, where Henoko is located, in January 2010. He declared opposition to the Henoko plan and defeated an incumbent who supported it. Inamine's election and the prefectural assembly's unanimous resolution pushed Okinawa's governor Nakaima Hirokazu to revise his acceptance of the Henoko plan. Nakaima participated in the Prefectural Citizens' Rally and since declared that relocation to Henoko is "close to being impossible" given the Okinawan public opinion. The

5 "Zen'in ga kenai hantai: Futenma isetsu 41 shichōsonchō ni chōsa [All in opposition to relocation within the prefecture: Futenma relocation, a survey on 41 city, town, village chiefs]," *Okinawa Times*, April 11, 2010.

governor is likely to maintain this tone while he fights for reelection in November against a challenger, the mayor of Ginowan where the Futenma Air Station is located, who clearly opposes relocation within the prefecture. The governor's permission is necessary to build the runway in Henoko by reclamation in the bay, and obtaining it will be a difficult hurdle for the Japanese government. The election for Nago's city assembly on September 12, 2010 also resulted in a shift in the majority from those supporting the Henoko plan to those opposing it, further complicating the situation for Tokyo.

Given the strong opposition to the Henoko plan, Kan will have enormous difficulty in implementing it. As many observers argue, the Henoko plan may well be impossible to implement if the opposition remains strong. What should Kan do in this context? First, he should remember that successful base policy negotiations—both with local communities and with the United States—require a strategic dialogue. He should publicly announce what he perceives as key regional and global challenges to Japanese interests, and how the Japan-U.S. alliance could be improved to address the challenges more effectively. He should then start a comprehensive strategic negotiation with the United States to improve the alliance. Within this dialogue, the two governments should make concrete progress to resolve the various base problems in Okinawa and other communities that host bases. Key among this effort is securing public safety around Futenma Air Station that remains open. The two governments must prevent accidents that involve civilian casualties at all cost. Such accidents will not only be tragic but also create a huge crisis for the alliance⁶. In

addition, governors of prefectures that host U.S. bases have requested a revision of articles in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)⁷. The two governments should consider their request, and negotiate a SOFA revision or an administrative improvement of the articles. Throughout this process, Kan should make sure to utilize the bureaucracies' expertise and secure the interests of the local communities that host military bases.

6 For example, Ogawa Kazuhisa proposes a series of steps for eliminating Futenma's threat to public safety. See his "Futenma mondai wa kōyatte kaiketsu surushika nai [Futenma problem can only resolved this way]," *Chuokoron*, May 2010, 122-129.

7 See, for example, the proposal for SOFA revision by the Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Division, <http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=1119&page=1> (In Japanese. Access on August 25, 2010).

2. The 50th anniversary of the Japan-US Security Treaty⁸ **- Gavan McCormack, Emeritus Professor, Australia National University.**

For a country in which ultra-nationalism was for so long a problem, the weakness of nationalism in contemporary Japan is puzzling. Six and a half decades after the war ended, Japan still clings to the apron of its former conqueror. Government and opinion leaders want Japan to remain occupied, and are determined at all costs to avoid offence to the occupiers. US forces still occupy lands they then took by force, especially in Okinawa, while the Government of Japan insists they stay and pays them generously to do so. Furthermore, despite successive revelations of the deception and lies (the secret agreements) that have characterized the Ampo relationship, one does not hear any public voice calling for a public inquiry into it. Instead, on all sides one hears only talk of “deepening” it. In particular, the US insists the Futenma Marine Air Station must be replaced by a new military complex at Henoko, and pundits throughout the country nod their heads.

Chosen dependence is what I describe as Client State-ism (“Zokkoku-shugi” [属国主義])⁹. It is not a phenomenon unique to Japan, nor is it necessarily irrational. To gain and keep the favor of the powerful can often seem to offer the best assurance of security for the less powerful. Dependence and subordination during the Cold War brought considerable benefits, especially economic, and the relationship was at that time subject to certain limits, mainly stemming from the peculiarities of the American-imposed constitution.

8 An abridged version of this article appeared in *Shukan Kinyobi* in January 2010

9 *Zokkoku – Amerika no hōyō to Ajia no koritsu* [Client state, America’s embrace and Asia’s isolation], Gaifusha, 2008.

But that era ended, and instead of winding down the “alliance” as the “enemy” vanished, the US decided to ramp it up. It wanted Japan’s Self Defence Forces to cease being “boy scouts” (as Donald Rumsfeld once contemptuously called them) and to become a “normal” army, able to fight alongside and if necessary instead of, US forces and at US direction, in the “war on terror.” It wanted Japanese forces to be integrated under US command, and it wanted greater access to Japan’s capital, markets and technology. “Client State” status required heavier burdens and much increased costs than during the Cold War, but it offered greatly reduced benefits.

Ever since the Hatoyama team first showed signs of being likely to assume government, and talked of “equality” and of renegotiating the relationship, Washington has maintained a ceaseless flow of advice, demand and intimidation to push it into traditional (ie LDP) subservience. The same “Japan experts” and “Japan-handlers” that in LDP times offered a steady stream of advice to “show the flag,” “put boots on the ground” in Iraq; and send the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, now send a steady drumbeat of: Obey! Obey! Obey! Implement the Guam Treaty! Build Henoko!

Yet there is little sign of outrage in Japan. Instead, US demands are echoed by a chorus of Japanese voices agreeing that Hatoyama and his government be “realistic.” One well-placed Japanese observer recently wrote (Terashima Jitsuro, *Sekai*, February 2010) of the “foul odor” he felt in the air around Washington and Tokyo given off by the activities of the “Japan-expert” and the “pro-Japan” Americans on one side and “slavish” “US-expert” and “pro-American” Japanese on the other, both “living off” the unequal relationship which they had helped construct and support¹⁰.

10 Terashima Jitsurō, “Nōriki no ressun94 (Tokubetsu hen), Jōshiki ni kaeru ishi to kōsō – Nichibei dōmei no saikōchiku ni mukete” [Learning from 1994

As the security treaty in its current form marks its 50th anniversary in 2010, it should be possible to reflect on the relationship, to continue it unchanged, straighten it out and revise it if necessary, or even to end it, but any such reflection is blocked by combination of cover-up of the past record, one-sided pressure to revise in a certain way, and political hype and rhetoric. As a result, in the year of the “golden Jubilee” anniversary, a more unequal, misrepresented and misunderstood bilateral relationship between two modern states would be difficult to imagine.

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Although Hatoyama calls for an “equal” relationship, the truth is that the US state does not admit the possibility of equality in its relations with any other state. The “closeness” and “reliability” of an ally is simply a measure of its servility. As Hatoyama’s team began to talk of equality and of an Asia-Pacific Community, Nye issued a series of warnings, first spelling out (in December 2008) the acts that Congress would be inclined to see as “anti-American,” prominent among them being : any attempt to revise the *Beigun Saihen* agreements (including the Futenma transfer).

Only twice have Japanese governments made an effort to think of an alternative to the dependence rooted in the treaties of 1951 (San Francisco) and 1960 (Ampo) that have formed the legal frame for the post-Occupation relationship. In the 1990s the Higuchi (Kotaro) Commission recommended to Prime Minister Hosokawa that Japan revise its exclusively US-oriented, dependent diplomacy to

(special issue) – Towards a reconstruction of the Japan-US alliance – A commonsensical alteration of its intention and structure] *Sekai*, February 2010, 118-125. Terashima refers to Japanese intellectuals by the term, “do-gan” (literally “slave face”, which he adapts from the savagely satirical early 20th century Chinese story by Lu Hsun).

become more multilateral, autonomous, and UN-oriented¹¹. However, a US government commission headed by Joseph Nye then advised President Clinton almost precisely the opposite: since the peace and security of East Asia was in large part due to the “oxygen” of security provided by US forces based in the region, the existing defence and security arrangements should be maintained, the US military presence in East Asia (Japan and Korea) held at the level of 100,000 troops rather than wound down, and allies pressed to contribute more to maintaining them. Higuchi was forgotten and the Nye prescription applied. Not until 2009 was the correctness of the Nye formula questioned.

It was Nye and his associates (notably Richard Armitage) who from 1995 drew up the detailed sets of post-Cold War policy prescriptions for Japan. Paradoxically, and also reflecting the “Client State” phenomenon, they came to be respected, even revered, as “pro-Japanese” or “friends of Japan.” They and their colleagues drew the 2000 goal (in the “Armitage-Nye Report”) of turning the relationship into a “mature” alliance by reinforcing Japanese military subordination and integration under US command, removing barriers to the active service of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces on “collective security” missions, and taking the necessary steps towards revising the constitution, and in 2007 the further agenda of strengthening the Japanese state, revising the (still unrevised) constitution, passing a permanent law to authorize regular overseas of Japanese forces, and stepping up military spending¹².

11 Boei mondai kondankai, “Nihon no anzen hoshō to boeiryoku no arikata – 21 seiki e mukete no tenbo,” (commonly known as the “Higuchi Report” after its chair, Higuchi Kōtarō), presented to Prime Minister Murayama in August 1994.

12 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020,” Washington, CSIS, February 2007.

The agreements on relocating US Forces in Japan (*Beigun saihen*, 2005-6) and Guam Treaty (2009) were the detailed policy instruments towards those goals. The “Futenma Replacement” (Henoko) project formed a central plank.

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The Treaty system whose anniversary is celebrated in 2010 has been unequal throughout its 50 years and is encrusted with deception and lies. The 1960 Treaty, rammed through the Diet in the pre-dawn hours and in the absence of the opposition, reconfirmed the (1951) division of the country into a demilitarized mainland “peace state” Japan and a directly American-controlled Okinawan “war state.” That division was maintained even when, much later, Okinawa was restored to nominal Japanese administration, in a deal that was also a model of deception. Firstly, the Okinawa “return” was in fact not a “giving back” but a “purchase,” Japan paying the US even more (for “return” of assets that in fact the US retained) than it had paid seven years earlier to South Korea in compensation for forty years of colonial rule. And secondly, although the deal was declared to be one of “*kaku-nuki hondo-nami*,” it was neither. The “war state” function remained central, bases remained intact and the US was assured (in the *mitsuyaku*) that its nuclear privilege would not be affected. Despite the nominal inclusion of Okinawa under the Japanese constitution, then and since it has continued in fact to be subject to the over-riding principle of priority to the military and in that sense, ironically, matching North Korea as a “*Songun* 先軍” state.

Both governments prefer secret diplomacy to public scrutiny. By simple bureaucratic decision, Japan instituted a system of subsidy for US wars known as the “*omoiyari*” (sympathy) payments and expanded the scope of the

security treaty from Japan and the “Far East” (according to Article 6) into a global agreement for the combat against terror. “Client State” Japan pays the US generously to continue, and not to reduce, its occupation.

In mainland Japan, political and intellectual resistance to the Nye Client State agenda for Japan crumbled nationally with the return to power in Tokyo of the LDP from 1995, and the qualities of nationalism, democracy and constitutionalism were gradually relegated to second place to the “higher” cause of the alliance. In Okinawa, however, civil democracy grew steadily and the Client State agenda lacked legitimacy.

Consequently, for 14 years, through the terms of 8 Prime Ministers and 16 Defense Ministers, the 1996 bilateral agreement to substitute a Henoko base for the Futenma one made no progress. It was blocked by the fierce, uncompromising, popularly-supported Okinawan resistance.

In 2005 Okinawan civil society won an astonishing, against all odds, victory over the Koizumi government and its US backers, forcing the Government of Japan to abandon the offshore” Henoko project. This was a historic event in the history of democratic and non-violent civic activism. The government returned to the offensive in 2006, however, with its design for an enlarged, on-shore Henoko base. This dual runway, hi-tech, air, land and sea base able to project force throughout Asia and the Pacific was far grander and more multifunctional than either the obsolescent, inconvenient and dangerous Futenma or the earlier offshore, pontoon-based “heliport.”

Though widely reported (with the subterfuge that is characteristic of the “Alliance”) as a US “withdrawal” designed to reduce the burden of post-World War II American military presence in Okinawa, the 2006 agreement would actually

increase the Japanese contribution to the alliance, and carried with it further huge sums in military subsidy (\$6.1 billion for US marine facilities on Guam and up to \$10 billion for a new Marine Base at Henoko).

When Obama took office in early 2009, his Japan expert advisers seem to have advised him to move quickly to pre-empt any possible policy shift under a DPJ government. They therefore exploited the interval when the LDP still enjoyed the two-thirds Lower House majority delivered by Koizumi's "postal privatization" triumph of 2005 to press the 2006 agreement into a formal treaty, have Aso ram it through the Diet (in May 2009), and thus tie the hands of the democratic forces about to be elected to government.

The Guam Treaty of 2009 was a defining moment in the US-Japan relationship, when both parties went *too far*, the US in demanding (hastily, well aware that time was running out to cut a deal with the LDP) and Japan in submitting to something not only unequal (imposing obligations on Japan but not on the US), but also unconstitutional, illegal, colonial and deceitful¹³. Yet few seemed able even to detect the "foul odor" that arose from the deal.

In Okinawa, however, the Hatoyama DPJ election victory of August 2009, followed by the 24 January Nago mayoral election, was taken as signalling that a democratic tide was rising. Opposition to any "within Okinawa" Futenma relocation becomes almost total. After 24 January, the threat to Oura Bay (and its dugong, coral and turtles) seemed drastically diminished. Having witnessed the lies and deceptions and trickery by which over 13 years the temporary, pontoon-supported "heliport"

gradually evolved into the giant, reclamation, dual-runway and military port project of 2006, and having experienced the emptiness of the promise of economic growth in return for base submission, today Okinawans are not to be easily tricked again.

If the two elections gave great heart to Okinawans, however, they also shook the "alliance" relationship. The construction of a Henoko base could only now be enforced if Hatoyama was prepared to adopt Soviet style, anti-democratic measures of something akin to martial law, which would be a peculiar way to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the "Alliance."

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At Honolulu in January 2010, Hillary Clinton insisted that the Ampo base system was indispensable for East Asian, especially Japan's, security and prosperity. It was essentially Joseph Nye's 1995 point. But is it true? The idea that the peace and security of East Asia depends on the presence of the Marines in Okinawa is peculiarly tendentious. There is today almost zero possibility today of an attack on Japan by some armed force such as was imagined during the Cold War, and in any case the Marines are an expeditionary "attack" force, held in readiness to be launched as a ground force into enemy territory, not for the defense of Okinawa or Japan as stipulated under Article 4 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Since 1990, they have flown from bases in Japan for participation in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars.

Furthermore, the hullabaloo in Japan surrounding the Henoko project rests on a serious misunderstanding. As Ginowan City mayor, Iha Yoichi, has repeatedly shown (including in this journal, 15 January) the Pentagon from 2006 has been committed to transfer main force Futenma marine units to

13 "The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 16 November 2009, <http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250>.

Guam, upgrading it into the military fortress and strategic staging post covering the whole of East Asia and the Western Pacific (and thus undercutting the strategic importance of any new Okinawan base)¹⁴. Iha's analysis was at least partially confirmed by a senior official of Japan's defense bureaucracy (Yanagisawa Kyôji, *Asahi shimbun*, 28 January 2010), who described the 3rd Marine Division as a "force for deployment at any time to particular regions beyond Japan ... not for the defense of particular regions"¹⁵. In short, the Guam Treaty is concerned not with a Futenma substitute but with construction of a new, upgraded, multi-service facility that U.S. Marines will receive for free and will use as a forward base capable of attacking foreign territories.

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Virtually without exception, American officials, pundits and commentators support the Guam treaty formula and show neither sympathy nor understanding for Japanese democracy or Okinawan civil society, and by and large the Japanese pundits and commentators respond to this in "slave-faced" manner (奴顔, in Terashima's term). The *Okinawa Times* (19 January) notes that the 50th anniversary offers a "chance to reconsider the Japan-US Security treaty that from Okinawa can only be seen as a relationship of dependence." To seriously "re-consider" would require wiping the "slave faces" off Japan's politicians and bureaucrats.

Hatoyama's government has enunciated idealistic sentiments, but has made little attempt to open debate on the Alliance or

14 Iha Yôichi, interviewed in "Futenma isetsu to Henoko shin kichi wa kankei nai," *Shûkan kinyôbi*, 15 January 2010, 28-9.

15 Yanagisawa Kyôji (special researcher and former Director of National Institute for Defense Studies), "Futenma no kakushin – kaiheitai no yokushiryoku o kenshō seyo," *Asahi shimbun*, 28 January 2010.

Okinawa's burdens and prominent ministers in his government, in "Client State" spirit, tend to identify with the position of the US government. Thus Foreign Minister Okada in Nago on 5 January pleaded with Okinawans to understand the "crisis of the alliance" and how "difficult" the negotiations are. He suggested that Okinawans should have sympathy for President Obama "who might not be able to escape criticism for weakness in his dealings with Japan at a time of falling popularity" if the Guam Treaty deal was not implemented. When Hatoyama announced that he would postpone the crucial decision till May 2010, a Pentagon Press Secretary declared that the US "did not accept" the Japanese decision, unnamed officials in Washington were quoted as saying of Hatoyama "We don't trust him," and Joseph Nye referred to the DPJ as "inexperienced, divided and still in the thrall of campaign promises," plainly meaning that attempts to renegotiate the Guam Agreement would not be tolerated. By May, Hatoyama must either reject the US demands, risking a major diplomatic crisis, or submit to them, announcing with regret that there is no "realistic alternative" to the "V-shaped" base at Henoko, thus provoking a domestic political crisis¹⁶.

While official 50th anniversary commemorations celebrate the US military as the source of the "oxygen" that guaranteed peace and security to Japan and East Asia, it is surely time for Japanese civil society to point out that the same oxygen is elsewhere a poison, responsible for visiting catastrophe in country after country, notably Korea (1950s and since), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) Chile (1973), Vietnam (1960s to 70s), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-), and that now threatens Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and (again) Iran. Millions die or are driven into exile, and counties are devastated as the US military spreads its

16 A crisis which indeed occurred: Hatoyama resigned in early June and replaced by Kan Naoto [note of the editor].

“oxygen” by unjust and illegal interventions. The degree to which allied countries share criminal responsibility has been the subject of major public review in Holland (which found that the Iraq War was indeed illegal and aggressive) and in the UK (where the Chilcot Inquiry continues). It is time for similar questions to be asked in Japan.

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The 50th anniversary should be a time for the Japan whose constitution outlaws “the threat or use of force in international affairs” to reflect on how it has come to rest its destiny on alliance with the country above all others for whom war and the threat of war are key instruments of policy, and whether it should continue to offer unqualified support and generous subsidy henceforth. As a first step, it is time to debate openly the unequal treaties, secret diplomacy, lies, deception and manipulation of the last 50 years.

POINTS OF NEWS

Okada Katsuo,

discusses the negotiations between the US and Japan over Futenma [Futenma nichibei kôshô no saizensen wo kataru Okada Katsuo], interview by Tahara Sôichirô, Chûô Kôron, July 2010, pp. 91-97. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

Why was the Prime Minister not on Okinawa in between March and April to explain why it would be difficult to remove the Futenma base from the department?

I believe that he wished to give as much time as possible to exploring the possibility of removing the base from Okinawa, and that took him until early May.

We have not just returned to the initial plan: some training exercises have been put off and we will seek all possible ways of meeting the wishes of the people of Okinawa.

When did the PM decide that it would be difficult to move everything elsewhere?

You must ask him!

It is clear that in October 2009, you and Mr. Kitazawa already believed that it would not be possible: you told Mr. Hatoyama yourself.

I did tell him that it would be very difficult to do.

So?

I cannot make any comment, but the PM insisted on reducing the burden carried by the people of Okinawa.

At the end of December 2009, you told him that because of the problem of the need for American forces to maintain deterrence capability, it would be difficult to move everything to Guam. That was the first time Hatoyama mentioned deterrence.

But just because it was not possible to relocate the base to Guam, that does not mean it had to be left at Futenma. It could have been put somewhere else in Japan.

Was that a real option?

In theory, yes. Earlier that year, Yanagisawa Kyôji, the former cabinet minister in charge of the Defence Agency (*Bôeichô kanbôchô*) published an article in *Asahi* in which he expressed doubts over Futenma's contribution to the deterrence strategy. Expert opinions are divided over whether the Marines are a necessary part of deterrence.

But you yourself thought that Okinawa should play that role?

The seas must be protected. Okinawa is close to eastern and southern China, so its geographical importance cannot be denied.

I had the opportunity to speak to Mr. Hatoyama alone after his first visit to Okinawa in early May, and I asked him why it took him so long to get there ...

So you don't have to ask me that question!

He replied that he had wanted to go earlier, that his close advisers told him that it was not worthwhile, and that he undertook to find

a solution before the end of May. To which advisers was he referring?

The Prime Minister did not mention it to me.

But what do you think about it?

I am not able to comment.

The second visit only poured oil on the flames, after a leak to the press and the publication of articles under banner headlines saying that "the US and Japan had reached an agreement".

Now we must try to clarify it.

The LDP is reported to have sent the PM to conduct negotiations in advance. Has the Minshutô given up this kind of secret negotiations?

I have nothing to say on that matter.

Is this work of persuasion a matter for the Kantei (Prime Minister and General Secretary to the Cabinet)?

As well as for the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a hand in the bilateral aspects. I went to Okinawa, but as soon as the respective roles of Japan and the United States had been clarified with the regard to those aspects, I kept within the division of responsibilities between the ministries.

Why was there the delay in May?

That delay had already been decided by the coalition. It took into account the need for the US Congress to vote for the funds to transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam.

If the Futenman base is now transferred to Nago, there is the risk of a local referendum being organised in September, at the same time as the local elections for City Governor:

and what if the “no” vote were to be carried?

That would not be the best outcome, even from the population's point of view.

When I met Mr. Hatoyama in May, he said to me “I have reflected on the deterrence question: there is nothing for it but to ask the people to understand that the base must stay on the island”. But the American forces there have practically no deterrent value. Deterrence implies a potential enemy: so who might invade us?

It is true that it cannot be spelt out, but in the context of Japan's overall strategic situation one could point to such matters as North Korea's attack on the South Korean destroyer, which is serious, or the growing power of the Chinese navy.

Isn't it sometimes said in the United States that the Cold War in Asia is not over?

The Cold War was a confrontation between East and West. No doubt there are some similarities, but I think that the deterrence conducted by the United States in the Far East is taking place in a far more dynamic situation than that of the Cold War.

What kind of changes are you referring to?

Not only China, but also India, Vietnam, and Indonesia are going to see considerable economic development. Many of these countries will increase their military expenditure, and that will affect the balance of power. That is why deterrence and the Alliance with the US are important factors.

During the Abe administration, Condoleezza Rice told Koike Yuriko that Japan seemed to have forgotten China.

Very few people nowadays think that China is a threat. It is important to Japan, and we must act to enable the Chinese to behave responsibly on the international scene. But that does not mean overlooking the fact that it is considerably expanding its military capabilities.

In view of the longstanding double digit expansion in China's defence budget, many people are beginning to wonder whether Japan ought to increase its own. What will the new defence provisions contain in material terms?

We are in the midst of a debate over the new provisions, but we must begin by asking where our current capabilities are deficient.

Faced with the swift rapprochement between China and the United States, it seems to me that our primary diplomatic concern is to decide what role to play in that relationship and how close our ties with China should be.

I do not agree. It goes without saying that China is an important country for us, but we share with the United States the same values of democracy and freedom. It is a mistake to put these two relationships on the same level.

Does the change in the US administration provide an opportunity to build a new Alliance?

I believe so. Since the summit meeting between Obama and Hatoyama in November 2009, we have been considering how to deepen the Alliance.

If it is a matter of rebuilding the Alliance, what should be changed or added?

For example, we need to consider whether the framework of the security treaty should allow the Self-Defence Forces to be deployed

anywhere in the world, or whether the activities under the aegis of the Alliance should focus on Asia, while the other SDF activities should be restricted to those conducted under a UN mandate. Koizumi gave the Alliance a global reach by deploying the Self-Defence Forces in Iraq. I think that decision should be reviewed.

The deployment in Iraq was a mistake?

Yes. It was a mistake to send troops without a resolution from the Security Council to authorise it¹⁷.

Are you in favour of the doctrine of legitimate collective defence?

We should first define what is meant by that. The Constitution stipulates that there should be no use of force.

But supposing that Taiwan was attacked by China, and that in going to her assistance, the United States came under attack?

We should not resort to force, but we could provide logistical support, for example.

And what about peace-keeping operations?

We can only deploy our forces on the basis of a UN resolution. We should do that more often. Under the Hatoyama government we sent 350 personnel to Haiti, and we are considering the possibility of participating in other operations.

Including Afghanistan?

That is not a Peace Keeping Operation but an operation conducted by ISAF, a multinational force aimed at keeping order.

Doesn't Ozawa say that the Self Defence Forces should be sent?

That is another issue, since it is not a question of a Peace Keeping Operation.

So you are against sending our troops to Afghanistan?

We always send our troops on the basis of resolutions passed by the United Nations, and we do not use armed force. There is nothing more to be said.

¹⁷ *Translator's note:* The Defence Forces were deployed after the resolution was adopted.



Kitaoka Shin'ichi,

«What are the prospects for the Minshutō under Kan?» [Kan minshutō no kanōsei wa doko ni aru no ka], Chûō Kōron, September 2010, pp.102-109. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

Kitaoka Shin'ichi, a Professor at Tokyo University, gives his views on how Japanese political life may recover a measure of stability: the Prime Minister must return to being the leader of a majority in the Lower Chamber.

In the July elections to the Chamber of Councillors, the Minshutō suffered a major setback. There are many who foresee a period of political turmoil. The Japanese take a dim view of rapid changes in government. If the government has made basic policy mistakes, it should resign. But if governments just fall one after another, perhaps the whole political of political life needs reorganising?

But to get back to the July elections, the Minshutō only managed to win 44 seats, which is ten less than the 54 which it held before the elections, and less than half of the 61 seats open for re-election. However, if the proportion of votes cast is taken into account, the Minshutō won 18.4 million votes (31.6%), well ahead of the 14 million cast for the LDP (24.1% of the total). In the constituencies with a single candidate ballot, the Minshutō garnered 22.7 million votes (39%) against 19.5 million for the LDP (33.4%). In terms of the number of seats won, while it took 19 seats against the

12 for the LDP in the first round, it only won 29 against 39 for the LDP in the second round. So its defeat is not due to the number of votes but to the number of seats which the votes failed to deliver.

As for the LDP, its tally is even less favourable than in 2007 when it lost control of the Chamber: it lost 2.5 million votes in the constituencies with proportional ballots. Parties like the Minna no tō split their support and doubtless contributed to the lower vote, but these minor parties mostly attracted the votes of electors who had supported the Minshutō in the previous ballot: so, far from recovering, the party is continuing to decline.

This apparent contradiction, between the numbers of votes cast and of seats won, is due to the fact that the country areas are proportionally better represented than the cities, where the numbers of votes have a proportionally lesser effect on the outcome. So the pathway to victory in the Upper Chamber lies through the countryside, which is also where the union organisations have a good deal of influence. Traditionally, these levers have been in the hands of the LDP. Last year one man tried to swing these votes over

to the Minshutō, and moreover in the general elections, namely Ozawa Ichirō.

But can Japan continue carrying its burden of indebtedness in its relations with the international community? Is it not already lagging behind in signing up to the free trade agreements? Now is the time for a party representing the urban electorate, free of organisational affiliations, to take control in Japan. That is what Koizumi Jun'ichirō tried to achieve. The party closest to bringing it about is the Minshutō, both because of the votes which it represents and the policies which it proposes to adopt. A government with its support is the one most likely to give the country the political stability and the economic development which it needs.

If there is such a strong desire for stability, that is certainly due to the lasting influence of the "1955 system". That period of LDP dominance was sustained by two factors: the Cold War and the medium-sized constituencies. For 40 years, the majority in Japan believed that the country should belong to the Western block, so it supported the LDP. But a good third opposed it and voted for the Socialists. The Socialist Party seemed destined to remain in opposition, but thanks to the electoral arrangements it managed to hold on and to retain a not inconsiderable number of seats. But the Cold War ended in 1989, and in 1994 the size of the constituencies was altered, which gave rise to far-reaching changes. The differences separating the policies of the parties became tenuous. But, far from diminishing, the competition between the parties became more intense in some respects. Formerly competition might be born out of a difference of political opinions, but nowadays it arises out of specific differences in policy. If the political parties came to an agreement to implement the policies which had been put to the electorate, the latter would be able to hold them to their word.

Moreover, since these differences are expressed less and less in terms of ideas, electoral support shifts more often; consequently parties find it increasingly difficult to maintain their majority. In fact, in all the national elections over the last twenty years, practically no party has ever failed to win two consecutive terms. The popular Mr. Koizumi himself has only known victory at the polls: at the four polls held during his terms in office (to the Upper Chamber in 2001, to the Lower Chamber in 2003, to the Upper Chamber in 2004, and to the Lower Chamber in 2005), two enabled him to increase the number of seats going to the LDP, one led to a decrease, and the fourth left him with the same number.

How does this compare with elections in other countries? It is not uncommon for a president to lose the mid-term elections; in Korea and Taiwan, presidents who were able to rely on healthy majorities have seen their popularity ratings fall abruptly. It is not abnormal for different parties to have the majority in the two separate chambers; in fact, it ought to be considered commonplace.

Under the LDP, the Prime Minister was replaced if the party had lost not only the general elections but also the elections to the Upper Chamber or the regional elections. The reason for this is that LDP governments were in fact coalitions of different factions, and every faction whose leader was not the Prime Minister was engaged in a permanent struggle to overthrow him. However, such changeovers had very little influence on the conduct of the government itself, which remained in the hands of the LDP. What should be re-affirmed in the present situation is that the Prime Minister draws his legitimacy from the Lower Chamber. (...) The fact that different majorities are in control of the two chambers ought to enable the adoption of policies requiring a broad consensus, like the reforms of the social security system or the fiscal system.



Mikuriya Takashi,

«Lacking direction, the political scene could end up without leaders with future prospects» [Kaizu naki nihon seiji, soshite daremo inakunaru], *Chûô Kôron*, September 2010, pp.110-117. (translated from the Japanese by Guibourg Delamotte, Asia Centre).

Professor Mikuriya of Tokyo University invites the Minshutô to draw lessons from the LDP's practical experience.

When the Minshutô took office in September 2009, it had a policy direction laid out in its manifesto. But now it appears to have lost it (...). It ought to learn from the earlier LDP experience. There was a time when some politicians entered upon their career with real professionalism. For example, when Nakasone Yasuhiro took office, he was so influenced by Tanaka Kakuei that his first term was dubbed the “Tanakasone” government. That damaged him, and he had to distance himself from that inheritance, which he did during the five years of his final term. In an interview with him, when I observed that his term had got off to a bad start, he confessed that he had prepared himself to become Prime Minister from the start of his political career; and he added, “That should always be the case, shouldn't it?” I share his opinion: that office would not be taken up in the same way by someone who just happened to be appointed as by someone who had made it his goal. Takeshita Noboru made his decisions after reflecting on the possible reactions of the respective parties over 10 years.

Currently the media talk of nothing but the “divided Diet” and its supposed deadlock, but the situation contains many lessons for the majority party. We are told that the Kan government will not be able to extricate itself from the morass, but if the LDP were in its place, it would have already envisaged several possible scenarios. Nonaka Hiromu used to say that to get a bill passed, you had to be ready to beg...

The general secretary of the Minshutô, Edano Yukio, stated that as soon as there was near agreement on policy, a coalition would be possible. In reality, the closer the political views the more difficult it is to form a coalition. The LDP knew that well: at the height of its power, it was not with the right wing of the Socialist Party that it formed links but with its left. That was particularly the case under Takeshita, who got his bills passed with their co-operation. That is why, with Takeshita's support, the socialist government of Murayama Tomiichi was able to emerge in 1994. To achieve results, working behind the scenes is absolutely necessary. It is precisely in the current situation that the fruits of that experience need to be recalled. But the Minshutô states that it no longer wishes to engage in these underhand tactics, and has in fact given them up...

EDITOR:

Guibourg Delamotte,
Assistant Professor,
National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Inalco), Center for
Japanese Studies (CEJ, Inalco) Research Fellow,
Associate Research Fellow, Asia Centre.

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Rozenn Jouannigot, Publications Assistant
Jonathan Hall, Translation
Florence Biot, Executive Director, Asia Centre

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