Auteur de la note

Anissa Aroun, Justine Collignon, Mila Issolah

Anissa Aroun is a lawyer in an association working at the Metz administrative detention centre, graduate in European international criminal law. She is particularly interested in issues related to migration, forced displacement, and the protection of the rights of vulnerable populations in an international context.

Justine Collignon is a master’s student in Geopolitics and Geospatial Intelligence at Sorbonne University. A graduate in International Relations from Sciences Po Grenoble, she is particularly interested in maritime issues and the geopolitics of Asia, topics on which she has written several articles as a member of the CEDIRE think tank. She also wrote a thesis on China’s exploration and exploitation of the seabed and completed an internship in the Strategy and Policy office of the Chief of Staff of the French Navy.

Mila Issolah is a master’s student in International Relations and Foreign Affairs at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. She holds a bachelor’s degree in public law with a specialization in Public International Law. Her current academic focus lies on the Indo-Pacific region, Central Asia, and the Arab world. For over a year, she has been contributing to the work of CEDIRE, a think tank specialized in foreign relations and diplomacy. She has also gained initial experience as an intern in research centres, particularly on issues related to refugee law.

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China’s Approach to the Law of the Sea A Maritime Power Instrumentalizing International Norms • Aroun Anissa, Collignon Justine, Issolah Mila

Anissa Aroun, Justine Collignon and Mila Issolah were awarded second prize of Prix Asia Centre for their essay “China’s Approach to the Law of the Sea – A Maritime Power Instrumentalizing International Norms”.

Find the full essay via the PDF button above.

In February 2025, the arrest of Chinese nationals in the Philippines for military espionage near the Spratly Islands rekindled tensions in the South China Sea, fully highlighting Beijing’s geopolitical and maritime ambitions. Such confrontations are not unfamiliar to the region: China has, for decades now, adopted a particular stance regarding the legal rules, and in particular the international law of the sea governing it.

Adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the rules governing the use of maritime spaces. Each coastal state can claim a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, where it exercises total sovereignty, as well as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, giving it exclusive rights over the exploitation of natural resources^[1]. Beyond this, the continental shelf can extend to 350 miles under certain conditions, while the high seas remain an international area governed by the freedom of navigation principle^[2].

In certain strategic regions, the application of international laws on maritime delimitation has given rise to numerous tensions, notably in the South China Sea. This key economic and geopolitical zone is marked by multiple territorial claims to islands and reefs, which provide crucial access to maritime resources and trade routes. China, seeking to assert its regional influence, relies on a contested interpretation of the international law of the sea to justify its claims. But its ambitions go far beyond the legal framework, and are fuelled by complex geopolitical considerations, which combine security concerns – such as the protection of trade routes and access to natural resources – with economic interests, notably linked to fishing zones and hydrocarbons.

These tensions crystallize around the famous “nine-dash line”, a delimitation claimed by Beijing that is based on historical grounds, which was rejected in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This decision further deepened disagreements over the application of UNCLOS in the region, fuelling a climate of persistent rivalries. Consequently, this calls for an analysis of how China approaches the law of the sea.

In order to gain a better understanding of China’s stance on the law of the sea, it is crucial to consider the relationship between the Chinese power and the maritime domain, which plays a central role in shaping its perception of international law (I), as well as to analyse how it seeks to free itself from the system of international norms by adopting a selective adherence to UNCLOS (II). Finally, the consequences of this attitude regarding international law of the sea will be assessed (III).

^[1] Articles 55 to 75 UNCLOS

^[2] Articles 86 to 120 UNCLOS

China’s Approach to the Law of the Sea – A Maritime Power Instrumentalizing International Norms: